Managing democratic transitions in Africa
In the March 29, 2008 general elections in Zimbabwe, the opposition party, Movement for Democratic Change with its leader and presidential candidate, Morgan Tsvangirai, jolted Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) with an emphatic win in the first round of balloting. However, quite bizarrely, no official results were announced for more than a month after the first round.
Meanwhile, during the one month of interregnum and after ZANU-PF stalwarts overcame their shock at losing the elections, they began thinking, planning and strategising on what to do next. Some were of the opinion that Bob Mugabe should just concede defeat and hand over power. Others, the more militant faction of ZANU-PF, dug in and opposed the handover of power to Tsvangirai. Mugabe, on his part, was disposed to conceding defeat. In fact, according to Wikileaks, Mugabe conceded defeat and sent emissaries to Tsvangirai on 1 April 2008 to negotiate his exit. Also, according to a cable sent by James McGee, then United States ambassador to Zimbabwe, Mugabe advised Tsvangirai that he would be stepping down on 2 April 2008 but wanted an additional six months in office. Tsvangirai reportedly rejected the idea. Still according to the leaked cable information, Mugabe’s emissaries said he would meet Tsvangirai the following day to announce his stepping down but did not pitch up.
No one knows what transpired and how the negotiations went. The opposition Movement for Democratic Change made all the noise and unsuccessfully sought an order from the High Court to force the release of the results. But on May 2, 2008, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) announced what many international and independent observers believed to be a sexed-up result – that Tsvangirai won 47.9% of the vote and Mugabe 43.2%, necessitating a run-off, which was to be held on 27 June 2008.
Clearly, Mugabe and ZANU-PF had worked on ZEC to prevent the outright declaration of Tsvangirai as winner so that there could be a run-off (the Zimbabwean constitution insisted that a candidate can only be declared winner if he wins majority of the votes cast).
The period following the first round allowed the Zanu-PF to unleash full violence on the opposition and on opposition strongholds. Such was the scale of the violence that Tsvangirai was forced to announce his withdrawal from the run-off, describing it as a “violent sham” and that his supporters risked being killed if they voted for him. But that was exactly what the ZANU-PF and Mugabe wanted. The elections went ahead with Mugabe as the only actively participating candidate. Of course, Mugabe won the second round by an overwhelming margin and was sworn in for another term as President on 29th June, 2008.
To placate the opposition and following international pressures, the ZANU-PF entered into a dubious power sharing arrangement with the MDC in which Morgan Tsvangirai was made a figure-head Prime Minister and Mugabe retained most of the powers.
There were many speculations as to why Mugabe back-tracked, but it was clear Mugabe didn’t trust Tsvangirai, and going by the official British policy of demonising him, he couldn’t trust Tsvangirai not to turn him in to the international criminal court at The Hague or even jail him at home.
It is through this prism that we can better understand last week’s volte face by Yahya Jammeh of Gambia after conceding defeat and congratulating the winner and president-elect, Adama Barrow. To begin with, no one predicted that the election was going to be free and fair. Virtually all political analysts and watchers of events in Gambia believed the election will be a sham with a predetermined outcome, especially with the shut out of international observers and the internet during the elections. But the unexpected happened. The electoral commission announced Adama Barrow the winner of the elections and President Jammeh graciously conceded and offered to meet Barrow to arrange transition.
Everything looked set for a peaceful transfer of power until late last week when President Jammeh made a volte face. Talking on national television, Jammeh said: “After a thorough investigation, I have decided to reject the outcome of the recent election. I lament serious and unacceptable abnormalities which have reportedly transpired during the electoral process…I recommend fresh and transparent elections which will be officiated by a god-fearing and independent electoral commission.”
What prompted Jammeh’s sudden action? It was the insinuations from the camp of the President elect that he will be prosecuted for his many crimes within a year of handing over the reins of government. President Jammeh was a brutal dictator who had governed with an iron hand for most of his 22 years in power. Human rights group and others have accused Jammeh’s government of detaining, torturing and killing his opponents during his rule.
Mr Jammeh had signalled that he intended to return to his farm in Kanilai, close to the Senegalese border to “eat what I grow and grow what I eat” – his favourite political slogan. But the incoming governing coalition felt Jammeh had “bunkers and treasure” to start an insurgency from his farm. The coalition suspects he wants to move all the weaponry and soldiers he had over the border to Casamance, in the south of Senegal to begin an insurgency.
Fatoumata Jallow-Tambajang, the architect and head of the coalition that defeated Mr Jammeh was quoted as saying:
“He can’t leave. If he leaves, he’s going to escape us,” she said. “We are stopping him from leaving. We are negotiating. He said he wants to go to Kanilai. Any day he tells us he wants to go abroad, then we say no. It’s the presidential prerogative.” “He will be prosecuted. I’m saying a year but it could be less than that.”
In effect, Yahya Jammeh, who previously vowed to bury opposition figures “nine feet deep” is facing the prospect of appearing at the International Criminal Court at The Hague, a court he gave notice of pulling out from but which the incoming government vowed to rejoin.
That was just too much for Jammeh to bear or contemplate.
That leaves us with the question of how to ensure peaceful democratic transitions in otherwise authoritarian states. Should the newly elected and democratic government promise or do a deal granting immunity from prosecution and special favours to the dictatorial regime it is replacing or should it refuse and face the kind of democratic reversals we witnessed in Zimbabwe and which is being threatened in The Gambia?
Christopher Akor